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a b s t r a c t
This paper presents an overview of possible risks to the security of health care data. These
risks were detected with a novel approach to information security. It is based on the
philosophy that information security risk monitoring should include human and societal
factors, and that collaboration between organisations and experts is essential to gain
knowledge about potential risks. The methodology uses a mixed methods approach
including a quantitative analysis of historical security incident data and expert elicitation
through a Delphi study. The result is an overview of the possible socio-technical risks that
a panel of experts expect to materialise in health care organisations in the near future.
These risks include (amongst others): staff leaving data assets unattended on the premises
and these assets consequently go missing, staff sharing passwords to access patient data
and staff sending email containing personal patient data to the wrong addressee thus
disclosing data to unauthorised persons. The expert panel recognized risks from current
discussion topics such as outsourcing, but these risks are still considered to appear less
frequently than the more traditional information security risks. Furthermore, the panel did
not estimate a high frequency of occurrence of socio-technical information security risks
caused by new technologies such as cloud computing or RFID.
ª 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Information security is an academic and business discipline
with a growing number of empirical studies being undertaken
and published. Despite this growth, limited research has
focused on studying information security risks in the health
care sector (Appari and Johnson, 2010, p. 280). In their over-
view of the current state of research of information security in
health care, Appari and Johnson (2010) conclude that “sur-
prisingly little research has been published about the use,
effectiveness and availability of information security risk
management methods in health care organisations”. Much
research is focussed on information systems solutions and
based on the concept of containment where information is
being kept within a certain perimeter and that it should be
protected from the threats from the outsideworld. Yet, almost
60 years of evolution of information securitymanagement has
changed the perception of risk, and nowadays it is generally
agreed that risks should be analysed from a wider context
(Gerber and von Solms, 2005; Pieters, 2011; Thompson and
Kaarst-Brown, 2005; Dourish and Anderson, 2006; Dhillon
and Backhouse, 2001). This is probably even more the case
in modern health care which is perceived as a complex envi-
ronment where technology, human risk factors, scope of
services, and geographical scope cannot always be separated
from each other. The variety within health care services,
ranging from scanning, epidemiology, diagnosing, caring,
insuring, online services, transportation or research makes it
hard to define the boundaries of what is the health care orga-
nisation as an entity. Traditional risk evaluation approaches
tend to be based on the concept of contained environments
and do not appear to deliver satisfactory results. Only a little
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anecdotal evidence of the successful implementation of risk
management frameworks can be found in the literature. In
this paper we show the results of an approach for risk detec-
tion and monitoring in a health care environment. This
approach was developed to enhance the mainstream infor-
mation security risk assessment approaches to provide a
better fit within health care. First we will briefly outline some
contemporary directions in information security thinking to
provide a brief background onwhy traditional risk assessment
approachesmight need enhancement. Thenwewill introduce
the methodology behind the approach and discuss the main
risk scenarios that could affect the security of health care data
in the near future.
2. Changes in information security risk
perceptions
The traditional implicit philosophy of the protection of infor-
mation is based on the notion of containment and to create
physical boundaries around assets, compartments or perime-
ters that need protection (Pieters, 2011). This perception of the
‘inside’ versus the ‘outside’ is becoming problematic as it is
getting more difficult to draw a line between insiders and out-
siders and it is not always clear where an organisation’s
boundaries lie. Employees are becoming mobile and are not
bound to geographical location to perform their jobs. Further-
more, many organisations outsource processes to third parties,
sharing data with them and connecting their networks. Illus-
trative examples for this change within health care are the
movements towardscloudcomputingandonline consultations.
A second change in perception is that increasingly the
socio-technical nature (Siponen, 2006; Bjork, 2004) of infor-
mation security is coming to the fore and the human dimen-
sion to both information security practice and technology
design is being recognised (Coles-Kemp, 2009). Socio-technical
studies consider, amongst other things, the interaction be-
tween the technology that is constructed and the people who
affect and are affected by the technology. Researchers have
adopted several underlying theories from reference disci-
plines such as psychology and sociology to analyse informa-
tion security risk management and economic theories to
characterise investment decisions and information gover-
nance (Appari and Johnson, 2010). The socio-technical
approach acknowledges the importance of ‘social’ or the
‘human’ factors in security management. In this approach,
human risks are separated from the technical information
security risks. Along with this socio-technical vision comes a
different way to measure risks. Where the traditional
perception was one of quantification and technology, the so-
ciologists evaluate risk by subjective perception based on
values, belief and opinion, which are influenced by factors
such as history, culture, politics, law and religion. Risk is seen
as subjective or perceived risk, rather than puremathematics.
Academic and practitioners are calling for integrated ap-
proaches where social sciences knowledge is included in the
risk evaluation approaches. Several such approaches have
been proposed since (Gerber and von Solms, 2005). However,
few of these approaches have been made concrete by means
of tools and guidelines and only anecdotic evidence of
successful implementations of such approaches in health care
has been found (Appari and Johnson, 2010).
A third change is seen in the traditional secrecy around
security. Where organisations traditionally treat information
about their security as company confidential information,
several researchers have argued that it is economically
beneficial for organisations to share their knowledge about
information security breaches (Liu et al., 2011; Gordon et al.,
2003). Sharing could help to make better decisions about in-
vestments in controls and provide organisations with better
preparation against potential risks.
The risks presented in the next section of this paper were
discovered through a risk monitoring methodology that in-
corporates the three changes in information security percep-
tions. Themethodology contains a collective security incident
database from several health care organisations and uses risk
forecasting techniques used in social sciences.
3. A methodology to monitor information
risks
3.1. The methodology
The risk monitoring method contains two on-going iterative
steps. In the first step, organisations record details of every
information security incident in a central database. This
central database uses a classification system to make sure all
participating organisations use the same structure to record
their data. The classification combines a number of classic
threat and vulnerability taxonomies known in security
research (Howard and Longstaff, 1998; Parker, 1998) and is
adapted to health care by adding health care specific termi-
nology (Brann and Mattson, 2004; Asaro et al., 1999; Carthey
and Clarke, 2010; Department_of_Health, 2010). Furthermore
it integrates factors to measure cultural and society risks
(Hofstede, 2001; Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010; Williams, 2004). The
classification of risk variables is added as Appendix A. The
research project aims to gainmore insight into socio-technical
information security risks and hence the classification elab-
orates on the human and organisation related risk factors and
specifically left out factors related to technical infrastructures.
To gather data for this database, a request was sent to
Freedom Of Information officers of the Scottish health boards
and English Care Trusts for insight in the information security
incident registers. A valid response rate of 72% was gained
through this approach. The responses were collected between
September and December 2010 and contained incident regis-
ters from 2005 to 2010. The returned incident registers
included some narrative information about incidents and a
basic categorisation of cause and location. All replies were
made anonymous, and restructured into the novel classifica-
tion where possible. Not all replies could be used as some
organisations released very limited details of their incidents.
In other cases, the style of reporting made it difficult for the
researcher to understand what had happened. Eventually
2108 incidents from 117 organisations were added to the
database. The result was an organised collective presentation
of the incidents that functioned as a simulation of a group of
organisations sharing knowledge of data security breaches.
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If a group of organisations should register incidents with a
common method and enough detail, a combined incident
registration database alone could already be a helpful tool for
health care organisations. Counting occurrences of variables
in a database gives some information about past incidents and
can be used to make decisions about the implementation of
security controls or information policy. With help from such
evaluation, an organisation could, for instance, decide to
focus on process improvements and employee training to
bring down the number of incidents caused by errors or sloppy
work practices when handling personal data. Otherwise they
could decide to invest in physical security measures to pre-
vent theft and damage. These will be potentially good de-
cisions, because they would be based on structured data,
however basic in its form (Hubbard, 2010). However, a security
breach is more likely to be caused by a combination of vari-
ables. Knowledge of the relationship between variables and
the scenarios in which an incident occurs is essential to really
understand the risks.
A quantitative analysis on the frequency of occurrence and
co-occurrence of each variable resulted in the visualisation of
risk scenarios. These scenarios are helpful to gain a better
understanding of what happens during an incident. The 2108
incident descriptions showed many identical incident sce-
narios and they could be grouped into 150 scenarios. Apart
from an overview of the most frequent scenarios, several
other conclusions could be drawn from this exercise. The
presentation of the incident registers from respondents
differed widely. Almost all of them were unique in their
format and descriptions of incidents. There appears to be no
commonly accepted approach to report and administer in-
cidents, even though national guidelines exist (Digital
information policy, 2009). The registers held only high level
information, no information was provided about the analysis
of the causes of the incidents and lessons learnt from them.
Information about organisational and cultural aspects had not
been included in any of the registers, nor were the motiva-
tional factors of the involved individual recorded. Damage
reports of the incidents were very limited, mostly stating the
number of patient records affected and sometimes including a
monetary value of hardware that needed replacement, but
hardly ever included the indirect damage of repair costs,
reputational damage, the effect on patient’s trust in the
organisation, or non-compliance issues. One observation was
that the organisations that provided the highest numbers of
incidents, also recorded them with more detail and included
near misses. It appears that these organisations might expe-
rience from a greater awareness and professionalism in in-
formation security and therefore report higher numbers of
incidents as they appear better in identifying and reporting
them. Overall, the registers that were provided to the
researcher appeared to lack the detail and knowledge to be
used to their full potential.
For this specific research, the quality of the data was only
sufficient for a simulation of the model. No main research
conclusions were drawn at his point as the collected data
should be interpreted with care. Firstly, the incident registers
are reflections of how the personwho keeps these records has
interpreted the incident and there were not objective and
detailed forensic reports of facts and timelines. Secondly,
these records were then again interpreted by the researcher
during the coding of events. For this reason, the collected data
cannot be treated as survey data in order to draw final con-
clusions. The quality of the data needed to be improved
through a second analysis. This second step is a three round
Delphi study where a panel of experts judge the scenarios
from past incidents and estimate how often they expect these
scenarios to re-occur in the near future. Furthermore the
panel describe additional risk scenarios they expect to take
place in the near future. The aim is to use the knowledge and
expertise of this panel to create estimations of the expected
frequency of occurrence of each risk scenario. This way, the
scenarios from the past that are of less importance for the
future will be devaluated against new occurring scenarios and
more important ones. The next section in this paper will
explain this Delphi study in more detail.
The final result is the presentation of the risk scenarios on
a risk map of likely information security risks in health care.
These risk scenarios should be constantly updated and
monitored, like images from a weather radar, so that at any
time of the day it will be clear if new risks are emerging. The
risk map is useful for the participating organisations to
benchmark themselves against other organisations, to make
decisions about investments in security controls, to learn
from past incidents and it could even to provide input for
policy makers on a regional level. This approach has potential
to support organisations to progress into a collective learning
organism which continuously updates and evolves its knowl-
edge of and response to information risks.
4. Risk expectations: findings from the
Delphi study
4.1. Introduction
The Delphi method is an iterative and structured process of
listing, refining, and aggregating the opinions and perceptions
of a group of experts. Delphi is a usual instrument in the areas
of technological and social forecasting, future studies, social
diagnosis, consensus interpretations of social or health re-
alities, communication and participation (Landeta, 2006).
AlthoughDelphi was developed in the 1950’s, the extent of use
in research has not fallen over the last 30 years, and between
2000 and 2005 years there has even been a greater prolifera-
tion of articles using this technique as an instrument, partic-
ularly in the fields of Social Sciences and Health Sciences
(Keeney et al., 2006). Delphi was chosen to enhance the
method because of the advantage of the multiple iterations in
the approach, where results can be compared and adjusted.
This gives the effect of interaction between experts and thus is
likely to increase the quality of the judgements. As informa-
tion is shared, it is anticipated that better arguments and in-
formationwill bemore important in influencing the group and
that redundant information will be discounted (Clemen and
Winkler, 1997). Another benefit is that Delphi has been
proven to be a useful instrument in scenario development.
The combination of Delphi and scenario thinking seems to
work well and it is highly applicable to this model where we
are looking to improve security risk scenarios. Furthermore, a
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Delphi type of study is highly recommended for obtaining
opinions from experts who live and work in different
geographic regions and settings (Pulcini et al., 2006; Rowe and
Wright, 2001). This is an important benefit, as the panel of
experts are based in different countries, and they are not be
able to get together to exchange their points of view person-
ally (this also dismisses the option of the nominal group
technique). The anonymity of the Delphi process also en-
courages open and honest feedback among experts (Gagnon
et al., 2009; Williams and Webb, 1994).
The process consists of a number of rounds of question-
naires and an analysis of the results. After each round, the
researcher provides an anonymous summary of the experts’
forecasts, as well as the comments that they provided with
their judgements. Each expert may then revise their earlier
answers in light of the replies of othermembers of the panel. It
is believed that during this process the range of the answers
will decrease, and the group will converge towards the “cor-
rect” answer. For this study, it was decided to limit the Delphi
study to 3 rounds.
4.2. The expert panel
The expert panel in this study consisted of 12 experts with
more than five years of expertise in a senior role in/Informa-
tion Security and related areas of expertise such as risk
management, IT Security, Information Governance or Data
Protection in healthcare organisations. The size of the panel
dropped in Round 2 to eleven and in Round 3 to ten. The input
of the remaining ten panel members is satisfactory, as ten is
considered a valid panel size for a Delphi study and an 83%
response rate as compared to Round 1 is still above the sug-
gested 70% retention rate to maintain rigour (Sumsion, 1998).
The level of professional expertise was also maintained in the
third round as illustrated in Table 1 below. In the first survey
round the panellists were asked to rate their own perception
of their expertise in different areas on a scale from 0 (no
experience) to 5 (expert). The panel members that completed
Round 3 had an average strong expertise in information se-
curity (4), information governance (3.8) and risk management
(3.8). They all work within healthcare or have a strong
knowledge of the sector. A limitation of the constitution of the
panel is a lack of academic research expertise to add more
philosophical consideration to the combined statements.
However, the seniority of the panel members was regarded
sufficient compensation.
4.3. The surveys
The experts were presented with a number of scenarios from
the database from the previous research step. They were
shown the six scenarios that had the highest frequency of
occurrence and the scenarios with the highest impact on the
number of patient records affected. They were asked to ex-
press their personal opinion about the frequency of occur-
rence in the near future and to motivate their choice. In
addition, a blank sheet with a part of the previously developed
classification for risks was provided to draw up one scenario
they thought was most likely to occur in the near future and
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number of patient records. After each round, the aggregated
data was presented back to them to judge once more until
three rounds were completed.
Round 1 started with six scenarios, based on the most
frequent scenarios derived frompast incident data. In Round 1
the experts created 14 additional scenarios. In Round 2 all 20
scenarios were presented to the panel and in Round 3 one
scenario had to be removed as it appeared to overlap toomuch
with one other scenario, causing confusion. The model now
contains 163 scenarios. Table 2 shows the list ofmost frequent
scenarios and the estimation of the frequency of occurrence
in the near future. This estimation is the combined frequency
from past experience and the expert’s estimations. For the
length of this article, we will not elaborate on the results of all
of these scenarios limit to the Top 6 of most frequent
scenarios.
4.4. The risk scenarios results
4.4.1. Scenario 1: unattended asset or record goes missing
In this scenario, an internal employee accidentally leaves a
record or a data-carrying asset unattended and as a conse-
quence this asset or record goes missing, directly leading to
disclosure and loss of data of up to 10 patients and indirectly
leading to costs and embarrassment for the staff or organi-
sation and affecting the compliance to regulation. The type of
asset is not specified in detail in this scenario. It could be
anything such as an i-Pad, smart phone, laptop, USB stick,
diary or a paper record.
The experts commented that this scenario happens with
unencrypted small devices (sticks, mobile phones, tablet PCs)
and paper records and that it happens often because items
are easily being mislaid and loose pages in records go
missing. It was also mentioned that very often it is not clear if
an item was mislaid or stolen. The scenario in which items
are stolen is described in Scenario 4: theft on the premises,
where theft can be proven. In the comments it was
mentioned that sometimes organisations combine these two
scenarios in their incident registers. In the scenario meant
here, items go missing by mistake, sloppiness or just un-
known causes.
This scenario was reported frequently in the registers of
past incidents (9% of all incidents), but the panel did not es-
timate the possible frequency of occurrence to be this high.
The majority of the panel (90%) estimate that this scenario
occurs sometimes (between 1 and 5% of all incidents). In-
dustry reports suggest that one of the biggest current trends is
the growing use of mobile devices (replacing un-mobile
desktops and workstations) to access and store patient re-
cords, leading to an increasing level of risk (Ponemon, 2011;
CompTIA, 2012), which supports the experts’ panel estimation
as one of the most frequent scenarios. However, the experts
also mentioned that the use of encryption, a ban on memory
sticks and thin clients or private clouds hosting virtual ma-
chines aremeasures that organisations are taking to lower the
frequency of occurrence of this scenario, and as a result the
expectation is that it will happen less frequent in the near
future.
The frequency estimations in Round 1 varied along a range
of 20. The range of answers declined in Round 2 and even
further in Round 3 to 5.5. The median remained the same but
the range of answers was drawn closer to the median. As the
mean and median were closer together in Round 3 and the
standard deviation decreased, the agreement amongst the
experts seemed to have increased. Furthermore, the
consensus rate went up from 40% to 90% for the category
sometimes: the frequency of occurrence of this scenario is ex-
pected to be between 1% and 5% of all incidents, in contrast to
the past experience, which was 9% ( frequently) (Table 3).
4.4.2. Scenario 2: password or access token sharing
In this scenario, an employee shares a password or access
token with someone and, as a consequence, patient infor-
mation is disclosed to an unauthorised person. The experts
agree that this scenario is likely to occurmore frequently than
registered in the incident registers. The experts rating the
frequency on the highest end suggest that it is not possible for
staff to work without sharing passwords as the systems are
not designed well in this area and that it is standard practice. It
is often not perceived as a risk, as it is sometimes in the best
interest of a patient and colleagues are allowed to see the data
anyway. Not only can this lead to disclosure of personal pa-
tient data, but auditing becomes an issue too.
Thework pressure and theway systems are designed seem
to enable this practice, and it is suggested to control this risk
scenario with awareness training, special arrangements for
temporary staff or trainees and additional terminals to work
from. This risk scenario been pointed out by other researchers
as well. A study of the state of information security in twenty
Dutch hospitals found that in two-third of these hospitals it
was common to share one logon id and password within a
department (IGZ/CBP, 2008). The work pressure and the way
systems are designed seem to enable this practice, and it is
suggested to control this risk scenario with awareness
training, special arrangements for temporary staff or trainees
and additional terminals to work from.
The panel estimates that the frequency of occurrence of
this scenario is higher than suggested by past incidents (9%
compared to 5%). After Round 3, the mean and median
became closer together and the standard deviation lower,
suggesting consensus amongst the respondents (Table 4).
4.4.3. Scenario 3: email to wrong recipient
This scenario was reported the most frequent in the registers
of past incidents. It involves emails containing personal data
of patients being sent to either the wrong recipients and/or to
persons not authorised to receive that information. It is a
scenario caused by unintentional mistakes by employees. The
risk is one that could lead to heavy fines, as can be illustrated
by the £80,000 penalty that the ICO in the UK imposed on a
County Council after a member of staff emailed highly sen-
sitive personal information about a large number of vulner-
able people to unintended recipients by clicking on an
additional contact list, which had only been intended for in-
ternal use (ICO, 2011).
The panel commented that some organisations do not use
email to exchange patient data and thus have a lower fre-
quency of occurrence. In other organisations it appears to
happen often and it can also mean that notes on patients are
included in meeting minutes. When the minutes are sent to a
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Table 2 e Overview of the scenarios.
Title Short description This scenario will happen:
Unattended asset goes
missing
An internal employee located on the premises leaves
an asset unattended and consequently
the asset goes missing. The asset contained personal
information of a few patients (less than 10).
Sometimes (7% of all incidents)
Password or access token
sharing
An internal employee shares his password or access
token leading to disclosure of patient
information to unauthorised persons.
Sometimes (7% of all incidents)
Email to wrong recipient An internal employee located on the premises sends
an email to the wrong addressee and
consequently discloses the personal details of a few
patients (less than 10 patients).
Sometimes (6.5% of all incidents)
Theft on premises Incidents that involve the theft of devices with
personal data from the premises of the
organization affecting 10-99 patient records.
Sometimes (5.7% of all incidents)
Procedure not followed An internal employee located on the premises does
not follow that formal procedures leading
to disclosure of patient information.
Sometimes (4.3% of all incidents)
Wrong privileges set An internal employee on the premises was
unintentionally given the wrong privileges or
authorisations, causing disclosure of personal patient
information to unauthorised persons.
Sometimes (4.3% of all incidents)
High impact mistakes Incidents involving medical or other internal staff making
a mistake affecting 1000e9999
patient records.
Rarely (1.5%)
Working in public place Incidents that involve medical staff working in a public
place with a laptop or talking over the
phone and being overheard or seen, leading to the
disclosure of personal data, affecting
0-9 patient records.
Rarely (1.3%)
Unsecure remote 3rd party An employee in a third party supplier or subcontractor
making a mistake when using remote
access from home or office and disclosing personal data,
affecting 100-999 patient records.
Rarely (1%)
Transportation An unknown person breaching confidentiality by copying
personal data on a storage medium
and transporting this medium for convenience, affecting
100-999 patient records.
Rarely (0.5%)
Family breach A family member/representative/carer or patient accessing
the unattended patient’s record




The loss of a portable backup medium during transport to
the offsite storage facility,
containing the full database of patient’s records,
affecting more than 10,000 patient records.
Very rarely (0.48%)
Improper disposal An employee in a third party supplier or subcontractor is
not taking due care when clearing
out a building or destructing records.
Very rarely (0.43%)
Third party discloses data Incidents that involve a third party supplier or
subcontractor unintentionally copying data
leading to the disclosure of personal data, affecting of
1000 to 9999 patient records.
Very rarely (0.28%)
Unsecure remote working An internal employee losing data through an insecure
remote working environment.
Very rarely (0.28)
External groups Incidents involving external groups or activists wanting
to steal, access, abuse or manipulate
personal data.
Very rarely (0.25%)
Trainee breach A trainee unintentionally accessing patient record
unauthorised.
Very rarely (0.25%)
Patient’s breach A breach at the patient’s home. Very rarely (0.23%)
Covering up errors Medical staff making changes in data, reports or
notes to gain status or to cover up errors.
Very rarely (0.14%)
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distribution list, it can easily happen that the list contains
people who should not receive these details.
The experts did not estimate the possible frequency of
occurrence to be as high as it occurred in the registers but
most of them commented that mistakes are easily and often
made. 90% of the experts expect the frequency of occurrence
of this scenario to be between 1% and 5% (this scenario will
happen sometimes), in contrast to past experience, whichwas
10% of all registered incidents. The mean and the median are
close together with a standard deviation of 1.27 (Table 5).
4.4.4. Scenario 4: theft on the premises
This was a scenario created by the panel in Round 1. The
scenario involves the theft of devices with personal data
stored on it from the premises of the organisation. It can lead
to a number of possible events such as loss of data and a
breach of confidentiality. Theft of computers, laptops or other
devices is the biggest causes of privacy breaches in health care
reported to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services. 50% of the published list of breaches of
health information affecting 500 or more individuals were
caused by theft (HHS, 2012).
The scenario was reported frequently in the incident reg-
isters although the experts together estimate the frequency a
little lower (the combined experts estimation is 5%, and the
past experience frequency was 6%).
70% of the experts agree that this scenario happens
sometimes (1%e5% of all incidents are like this scenario). One
expert suggests that this scenario could be combined with lost
assets, as it is often not clear whether an item was lost or
stolen. One outlier on the high end of the range (suggesting
10%) argues that this happens frequently and he refers to an
example where a PC was stolen from a drug addiction unit, by
drug dealers, with the sole intent of using the list of patient
names as a “marketing database”.
For this scenario the consensus has grown over the three
rounds and the mean and median are close together. Table 6
shows no data for Round 1 because the scenario was created
in Round 1. In Round 3 the range was smaller than in Round 2
and themean andmedian are almost equal. The one outlier at
Table 3 e Descriptive statistics (Scenario 1).
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus
Very rarely (<0.5%) 2 17% 2 20% 0 0%
Rarely (0.5e1%) 0 0% 1 10% 0 0%
Sometimes (1e5%) 5 42% 4 40% 9 90%
Frequently (5e10%) 4 33% 3 30% 1 10%
Very frequently (>10%) 1 8% 0 0% 0 0%
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Median 5.0 4.5 5.0
Range 20 10 6
Largest 20 10 8
Smallest 0 0.5 2.5
Mean 6.1 4.6 4.9
St Dev 5.5 3.6 1.36
Count 12 10 10
Table 4 e Descriptive statistics (Scenario 2).
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus
Very rarely (<0.5%) 2 17% 1 10% 0 0%
Rarely (0.5e1%) 3 25% 0 0% 0 0%
Sometimes (1e5%) 1 8% 0 0% 2 20%
Frequently (5e10%) 4 33% 6 60% 8 80%
Very frequently (>10%) 2 17% 3 30% 0 0%
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Median 5.0 8.9 8.9
Range 29.9 29.5 5.0
Largest 30.0 30 10
Smallest 0.1 0.5 5
Mean 7.7 11.3 8.1
St Dev 9.3 8.5 2.12
Count 12 10 10
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10 makes the range of answers large (8) and the standard
deviation high (2.18).
4.4.5. Scenario 5: procedure not followed
Not following the formal procedures could lead to the disclo-
sure of patient information to unauthorised persons, affecting
compliance to regulation. A number of annual industry sur-
veys recognize this scenario as one of the most frequent ones
as well, and refer to this type of scenario as “information se-
curity awareness”, an umbrella term that often includes the
behaviour, motivation, knowledge and skills of employees
regarding information security. For instance, in the 2010 Kroll
Fraud Solutions survey, themost frequently selected item that
would put data at risk was lack of attention by staff to security
policy (Kroll-Fraud-Solutions, 2010).
Some of the comments made by the experts refer to staff
often breaching policy and procedures but “this is not always
reported as an incident”. Staff tend to be helpful and fix
problems outside of procedures when there is an urgency.
Proper training, security awareness programmes and
sanctions are suggested to have a positive influence in con-
trolling this scenario, although in a medical environment
there aremany procedures which contain checks so faults are
often detected before an incident happens and procedures are
continuously improved to become more fault resistant.
Over the three rounds, the range of frequency estimations
shrunk but was still large. Table 7 shows that Round 2 had
outliers with higher estimations and lower estimations and
Round 3 only had one outlier on the top. The individual with
the higher estimation motivated his estimation with com-
menting that it may occur more frequent but it is often not
reported.
The experts estimated the possible frequency of occur-
rence of this scenario almost similar to the frequency of past
incidents (which was 4%). 80% of the experts in the panel es-
timate the frequency to be between 1% and 5%. Table 6 shows
that the median and mean are close together and that the
standard deviation is still large, but got lower over the three
rounds and 80% of the estimations are now within the same
interval.
Table 5 e Descriptive statistics (Scenario 3).
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus
Very rarely (<0.5%) 2 17% 1 10% 1 10%
Rarely (0.5e1%) 1 8% 2 20% 0 0%
Sometimes (1e5%) 5 42% 7 70% 9 90%
Frequently (5e10%) 4 33% 0 0% 0 0%
Very frequently (>10%) 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Median 2.3 3.0 3.0
Range 9.9 4.5 5.0
Largest 10.0 5 5
Smallest 0.1 0.5 0
Mean 4.2 3.1 2.8
St Dev 3.8 1.9 1.27
Count 12 10 10
Table 6 e Descriptive statistics (Scenario 4).
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus
Very rarely (<0.5%) 0 0% 2 22% 0 0%
Rarely (0.5e1%) 0 0% 1 11% 0 0%
Sometimes (1e5%) 0 0% 5 56% 7 70%
Frequently (5e10%) 1 100% 1 11% 3 30%
Very frequently (>10%) 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Median 7.5 5.0 5.0
Range 0.0 9.9 8.0
Largest 7.5 10 10
Smallest 7.5 0.1 2
Mean 7.5 3.7 5.0
St Dev e 3.2 2.18
Count 1 9 10
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4.4.6. Scenario 6: wrong privileges set
This scenario describes how flaws in the settings of author-
isations and privileges in systems can lead to confidentiality
breaches because unauthorised employees receive or can read
personal data they should not have access to. Table 8 shows
the taxonomy for this scenario, where 100% of the panel now
estimates that this scenario will occur in 1%e5% of all
incidents.
Earlier, in Round 2 it had showed a few outlying answers.
From the comments made by the experts who estimated the
frequency of occurrence as high, it seemed that, according to
their opinion, “identity and access management are not
often implemented successfully in organisations”. The pro-
files of these experts (ID14, ID15, and ID17 in Round 1)
showed that these are the panel members with the highest
expertise level in IT security. On the contrary, the experts
who rated the frequency the lowest, refer in their comments
to be confident that the procedures should cover this risk and to
have confidence in the IT staff. This relation was shown to the
experts in Round 3, as it could influence their point of
view on the scenario. In Round 3, indeed the differences
completely disappeared. Some of the experts suggest
that the IT staff usually follows the procedure but the man-
agers who authorize the privileges do not perform periodic
review to cancel or change privileges when no longer
necessary.
The experts estimate the possible frequency of occurrence
lower than the frequency of past incidents showed (was 6%).
The range of expert estimations decreased from 14.8 in Round
1 to 8.5 in Round 2 and dropped even more to 2.5 in Round 3.
The estimations for this scenario had the lowest standard
deviation of the Top 6 scenarios (Table 8).
4.4.7. Other scenarios
Not all scenarios could be discussed here. It is however worth
mentioning that third parties such as partner organisations or
subcontractors also are important risk variable as they have
access to, process or store data on behalf of the organisation. It
is often difficult to control in detail what security measures
are implemented in the organisation of that third party.
Table 7 e Descriptive statistics (Scenario 5).
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus
Very rarely (<0.5%) 3 25% 1 10% 0 0%
Rarely (0.5e1%) 2 17% 1 10% 0 0%
Sometimes (1e5%) 2 17% 5 50% 8 80%
Frequently (5e10%) 5 42% 3 30% 2 20%
Very frequently (>10%) 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Median 4.0 3.5 4.5
Range 9.9 9.5 6.8
Largest 10.0 10.0 8.8
Smallest 0.1 0.5 2
Mean 4.4 4.3 4.3
St Dev 3.9 3.4 2.11
Count 12 10 10
Table 8 e Descriptive statistics (Scenario 6).
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus
Very rarely (<0.5%) 4 33% 1 10% 0 0%
Rarely (0.5e1%) 3 25% 1 10% 0 0%
Sometimes (1e5%) 3 25% 6 60% 10 100%
Frequently (5e10%) 2 17% 2 20% 0 0%
Very frequently (>10%) 1 8% 0 0% 0 0%
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Median 1.7 2.3 2.5
Range 14.8 8.5 2.5
Largest 15.0 9.0 4.0
Smallest 0.2 0.5 1.5
Mean 3.7 3.0 2.8
St Dev 4.4 2.6 0.8
Count 12 10 10
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Industry reports point out that third parties are a growing
threat to the security of patient data with the growing inter-
connectivity between organisations, outsourcing and up-
coming solutions such as cloud computing. However, the
panel did not rate of this kind of scenarios as very common,
but when it happens, the impact is usually high and affecting
high numbers of data.
4.4.8. Discussion Delphi study
The estimations of the panel appear to agreewith a number of
future risks highlighted in industry reports. All the most
frequent scenarios are directly caused by human actions and
related to human behaviour, organisational culture and per-
sonal motivation. The risks associated with sharing data with
third parties such as suppliers, outsourcing partners or other
health care provides appear to be on the experts’ radar. One
observation from the comments made by the experts and the
scenarios they could add in the blank sheet is that none of
panel indicated to risks linked to society, public policy or
human-artefact integration (such as online patient moni-
toring systems, RFID chips or implants). The Delphi study
appeared to be a learning curve for the participants. The
combination of being informed from incidents in the pastwith
continuous input from other experts in the field, caused the
opinions of the participants to converge over the rounds. This
was visible in the frequency estimations they made as well as
in the comments. Where in some scenarios the comments in
Round 1 were very diverse, in Rounds 2 and 3 they showed
more understanding of other opinions and some participants
changed their own opinions. Delphi has proven to be a useful
technique to support learning about emerging risks and could
be used in a real-time risk monitoring system that continu-
ously is updated with the data from incidents and expert
opinions.
5. Conclusion
By means of the Delphi study we gained the experts’ opinions
about the frequency of occurrence of socio-technological risk
scenarios and identified additional risk scenarios that the
experts consider trending. The Delphi study through an online
survey proved a useful technique in this methodology as it
delivered a combined statement of opinion of a group of ex-
perts from different geographical locations, who would
otherwise be difficult to get together physically for a group
discussion. The result is a list of future risk scenarios that
threaten the confidentiality, availability and integrity of
health care data. These scenarios are limited to the socio-
technical context of the health care organisation, focussing
on human behaviour and can be used alongside the
commonly used threat and vulnerability models that
specialise in information systems and infrastructure security.
The results appear to agree with a number of future risks
highlighted in industry reports. This may indicate that the
suggested model with the combined data from incident da-
tabases and expert’s opinions could work to make a reliable
risk monitoring approach. However, the panel’s estimations
of frequency of occurrence of the more traditional risks such
as sharing passwords or loosing assets remained higher than
the estimation for the risks involved with new technologies
such as Cloud Computing or RFID. This could indicate that
organisations could be facing new risks through new tech-
nologies but at the same time still have not managed to
contain the traditional risks in the context of the organisa-
tional culture and human resources.
Appendix A. Classification of health care data
security risk variables
Variable Group Subgroup









Employee in partner organisation or related
healthcare provider
Employee in third party supplier or contractor
Patient
Family or carer/representative of patient


















Social Change in legislation
Change in organisation/merger/acquisition
Change in organisational policies
Implementation of new infrastructure
Implementation of new marketing medium
New products or services developed
New trends in society (flashmob,
project x, social media)
























Location of initiative On the physical premises of the organisation
At the patient’s home/environment
At the staff members home/environment
Public transport
On the premises of other healthcare
provider or related organisation
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Weakness that can be exploited Human or organisational
vulnerability
Unattended asset or record
Email recipient entry errors





Informal conversation in public area
Telephone conversation in public area
Flaws in settings in
authorisations/privileges
Sharing of password or access token
Paper record in internal post
Paper record in external post
Organisational changes, new
procedures, routines
Security flaw in storage of data
Lack of security in email application
Fax to wrong recipient
Hasty working
Lack of control of outsourcing partner






Lack of learning culture: the organisation is
not committed to learn lessons, to
communicate them to colleagues and to
remember them over time
Social atmosphere within organisation
Closed culture: staff not feeling comfortable
discussing incidents and raising issues with
both colleagues and senior managers
Unjust culture: staff, patients and carers are
not treated fairly, with empathy and
consideration when they have
been involved
in an incident or have raised an issue
Lack of reporting culture: staff have
no confidence in the local incident
reporting system and do not use it to notify
healthcare managers of incidents that are
occurring, including near misses
Lack of informed culture: the organisation
has not learnt from past experience




Physical security vulnerability Transportation of storage medium
Fax received in unsecured physical
environment
Printer in unsecured environment

























Availability breach Data lost or gone missing
Destroy personal data
Damage personal data or facilities
Delay process
Data, notes or reports not available
when needed
Integrity breach Insert false data, notes or reports
Modify notes, data or reports
Remove parts of data, notes or reports
Other:.










Indirectly causing Embarrassment to the organisation
or medical staff
Embarrassment to the patient
Affecting reputation of organisation
or medical staff
Patients choosing for other healthcare
provider
Loss of health or life of patient
Discrimination
Quality of care affected
Compliance to regulation affected
Tensions in work environment for
medical staff
New products or services stalled
Other:.
Unknown
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